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Abstract  
Whereas the dominant theoretical perspective in corporate governance research attends to 
the conflicting interests between shareholders and executives, in practice executives must 
frequently adjudicate between the demands of multiple principals with conflicting interests. To 
investigate how executives cope with these conflicts, I examine how much firms claim they will 
earn on the assets in their defined benefit (DB) pension plans. In a DB arrangement, participating 
employees forgo wages in the present in order to receive post-retirement income and they rely on 
executives to properly fund and manage plan assets for future payout. Executives, however, can 
act opportunistically by increasing the amount they expect the firm to earn on plan assets, 
effectively lowering their pension expenses and boosting the firm’s earnings. Whether executives 
do so, I argue, is determined in part by the power and interests of employees and shareholders as 
well as the decision-making schemas of the CEO. Through a detailed analysis, I show that equity 
ownership by bank trusts and public pension funds and the presence of a CEO with a background 
in finance are associated with higher expected rates, while higher rates of firm unionization are 
associated with lower expected rates of return on such assets.  
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Understanding the factors that influence executive decision-making is a core question of 
management research, as scholars have long recognized that executives often confront 
conflicting demands from various groups making claims on the firm’s resources (e.g., Barnard, 
1938; Cyert & March, 1963; Selznick, 1948; Weber, 1978). An important dimension of this 
claims-making process is that each stakeholder group has its own set of interests to be met across 
different time horizons, allowing the firm to make promises of varying durations to the groups 
based upon their preferences (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 96-100). One way firms do so is by 
transferring obligations between the present and future. Accomplishing this conveyance across 
periods requires the firm to anticipate future states based on the imperfect information available 
at the present. When predictions about future states prove incorrect or when past promises 
conflict with influential stakeholders’ expectations, keeping such promises can be challenging.  
How executives manage these promises and thus adjudicate between the goals, interests, 
and time horizons of various stakeholders is a fundamental question of corporate governance 
(Davis, 2005). Researchers have predominantly studied corporate governance through the lens of 
agency theory, which views corporations as a nexus of contracts between principals who seek to 
achieve some outcome and agents, the party hired to provide the necessary assistance (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). While enlightening, traditional agency theory focuses primarily on the 
contracting arrangements between shareholders and executives and thus overlooks the 
importance of other stakeholders, the commitments made to them by the firm, and their ability to 
monitor and influence executive decision-making (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 
2008). In particular, in many organizational settings there exists more than one principal (Chang, 
2003); however, how executives manage this complexity has not been fully examined. In 
particular, in a context where executives must decide between the interests of two sets of 
conflicting principals, what factors motivate them to favor one group over the other?  
I attempt answer this question by investigating the amount firms claim they will earn on 
the assets set aside to finance an explicit promise made to their workers: the defined benefit (DB) 
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pension. We can think of DB pensions as a form of inside debt (cf. Sundaram & Yermack, 
2007), whereby employees effectively forgo present wages in exchange for income in retirement 
(Kruse, 1995). To finance a DB plan, the firm must reserve enough funds to cover the future 
liabilities owed to workers. While there are several assumptions firms must make to do so, the 
expected rate of return (ERR) on pension assets is one of the most impactful on a firm’s pension 
expenses and one that executives maintain latitude in setting. In practice, firms invest the funds 
they set aside to meet their future pension obligations and estimate a return on those investments. 
These estimates, rather than actual returns, determine the firm’s pension costs. Aggressive 
expectations, while boosting earnings in the present, compromise the long-term health of the 
firm’s pension fund if not matched over time by actual returns (Waring, 2012). Manipulating 
pension assumptions, therefore, is commonly seen as a form of earnings management (Comprix 
& Muller, 2011), that is, one of a set of practices executives can use to influence financial 
reporting in a way that is advantageous to the firm and/or its decision-makers.  
Workers, therefore, entrust executives to properly finance and manage DB plans in 
exchange for work done in the present. Hence, we can consider DB participants to be principals 
with a claim on a portion of the firm’s assets. Increasing the ERR transfers funds that would have 
gone toward the firm’s DB plan to its reported earnings, and executives have the scope to act 
opportunistically by doing so (Eaton, Nofsinger, & Varma, 2014). Importantly, executives are 
also agents to investors (Fama, 1980)—many of whom have a shorter time horizon than 
workers—and the pressures executives face to appease investors may prompt executives to find 
ways to boost current earnings. As such, ERRs are an appealing context to assess principal-agent 
conflicts as executives have the discretion to allocate the firm’s rewards between two 
principals—employees and investors—with different interests, sources of influence, and time 
horizons.  
Incorporating insights from socio-political theories of the firm (e.g., Cyert & March, 
1963), power-dependence perspectives (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), and stakeholder theory 
4 
 
(e.g., Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997), I develop a simple theoretical framework to examine how 
executives adjudicate between two principals. My core argument is that because complex 
organizations have multiple goals that often conflict, which goals executives prioritize depend, in 
part, upon the saliency of stakeholder interests (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999). Because 
executives have discretion in setting the ERR, I expect that their willingness to boost earnings by 
increasing it is guided by the power and interests of employees and shareholders as well as the 
decision-making schema of the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO).  
Through a detailed analysis of a large sample of large US employers from 1992 to 2006, I 
find evidence that each of these three factors affects the propensity for CEOs to change the ERR 
on pension assets. In so doing, I make three main advances to existing research. First, I provide a 
more complete depiction of the governance process, whereby employees are also principals, 
shareholders have diverse interests, and executives rely on their own decision-making schemas 
to adjudicate between the two groups. By showing that power dynamics and CEO schemas help 
determine how conflicts between two principals are managed, this study complements and 
extends literature attending to the complexity associated with managing multiple stakeholders 
(e.g., Arthurs, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Johnson, 2008; Coff, 1999; Kacperczyk, 2009).  
 Second, this study builds on the recent work examining how firms’ equity ownership 
structures and overall power dynamics affect employment-related outcomes. Unlike layoffs 
(Jung, 2014) or retirement plan participation (Cobb, 2015), however, with ERRs the operational 
and financial impetus for the change can be at least somewhat separated. This distinction is 
important because the tradeoff between providing additional funds to a pension plan or to firm 
earnings is direct and immediate, allowing for a cleaner test of how executives adjudicate 
between opposing stakeholders. Similarly, this study expands upon the recent work by Cobb 
(2015), who found that the desire to minimize the financial uncertainty that accompanies DB 
plans was a factor in firms decreasing the size of their plans. In this study, I show how firm 
ownership structure and a CEO’s background help create that uncertainty and how employee 
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power mitigates it. Lastly, this paper also makes an important contribution to the study of 
pensions as it is, to my knowledge, the first to show that employees, investors having different 
legal forms, and a CEO’s background play a key role in how firms set their ERRs. 
PENSION ASSUMPTIONS AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
To examine more fully how stakeholder contestation affects a firm’s pension decisions, I 
first provide a brief overview of how firms design and account for DB plans. Firms structure 
their DB pensions to provide each participant a fixed, annuitized source of post-retirement 
income. The rate of income is determined using a formula based on the worker’s length of 
service and wage around the time of retirement. Take this simple benefit formula: 
𝑋𝑋 = 𝑏𝑏 ∗𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑆𝑆 
where b is the benefit percentage (typically between 1 and 2.5%), Wf is the “final wage” based 
on the last year or the average of the last years of employment, and S is the number of years of 
service in the firm. Estimating the future liability for a workforce necessitates developing 
predictions about the number of individuals who will retire n years in the future, their expected 
wage rate at that time, and how many years of service they will have accumulated (Orr, 1998). 
The firm commits to pay the cost of these promised benefits and thus incurs a liability equal to 
the present value of all future payments owed to its workers. The firm funds this liability with 
pension assets, investing them in financial vehicles such as debt, equities, and insurance assets.  
There are three key calculations required to determine the annual cost of DB plans. The 
first is service cost, which represents the increase in the pension obligation related to workers 
who have accrued another year of service. Firms also calculate interest cost, which is the interest 
accrued on the pension liability arising from the passage of time. The last factor is the ERR on 
plan assets, which is an estimate of how much the firm’s pension assets will earn—a value that 
offsets the service and interest costs. Under Accounting Standards Codification 715, employers 
have discretion in choosing their pension ERRs. Accounting rules allow for the use of the 
expected, as opposed to the actual, rate of return in order to insulate firm earnings from year-to-
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year market swings. Over time, firms must reconcile the difference between the expected and 
actual returns, but this occurs over long amortization periods.2 Thus, by increasing its ERR, an 
employer can decrease reported pension expenses and shift its obligations to its employees 
further into the future. Doing so allows an executive to boost a firm’s market value, as evidence 
shows that earnings associated with changed pension assumptions are capitalized into the share 
price in a manner similar to operating earnings (Coronado & Sharpe, 2003; Picconi, 2006).  
To illustrate the impact of ERR increases on firm earnings, take the following example of 
IBM Inc.3 In 1997, the firm increased its ERR from 9.25 to 9.5%, which accounted for about 
1.5% of its pretax income between 1997 and 1999. Despite poor equity market returns and 
declining bond yields, IBM raised the ERR again to 10% in 2000. As a result, its pretax income 
in 2000 and 2001 income was nearly 5% greater than it would have been with an ERR of 9.25%. 
Between 1995 and 2001, IBM’s pretax income grew at an annual compound rate of 6.7%. Were 
it not for the two ERR increases, it would have grown at a rate of only 5.6%. 
To be clear, when a company like IBM states that it expects to earn a 10% return on its 
pension assets, it is claiming that, on average over time, the funds the firm set aside and invested 
to meet its liabilities will earn 10% in returns. Taking into account dividends and inflation, 
between 1870 and 2010, the S&P 500’s real return averaged around 6.5% per year. Coupling this 
with the fact that firms invest large portions of their pension assets in corporate and government 
bonds, which typically yield lower—though less volatile—returns, one might reasonably 
conclude than an expected return of 10% is overly optimistic.4 In fact, legendary investor Warren 
Buffet once critiqued the propensity of firms to use overly optimistic assumptions, stating, “I 
                                                          
2 Deviations between actual and expected returns are entered as an off-balance-sheet, unrecognized gain or loss. The 
rules governing reconciliation between the actual and expected return rate are based on the corridor approach, 
whereby the accumulated unexpected gains or losses are compared to the beginning pension benefit obligation 
balance and the market value of the plan assets. Any amount greater than 10% of the larger of the two is amortized 
over the remaining service lives of the firm’s employees (see Bergstresser, et al., 2006, for more detail). 
3 This example was taken from Bergstresser, et al., (2006: 158-159). 
4 Prior research has found that firms hold, on average, about 26% of their assets in corporate equity and about 31% 
in government debt and cash, 23% in insurance assets, and 21% in other types of assets, such as real estate, 
corporate bonds, and private equity (Rauh, 2009).   
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invite you to ask the CFO of a company having a large defined-benefit pension fund what 
adjustment would need to be made to the company’s earnings if its pension assumptions were 
lowered to 6.5 percent” (Buffett & Loomis, 2001).  
Researchers and commentators commonly view the manipulation of pension assumptions 
as a form of earnings management (An, Lee, & Zhang, 2014; Revell & Tkaczyk, 2002). 
Examining this type of earnings management is useful for the study of executive decision-
making for several reasons. First, executives have substantial discretion when setting the ERR 
and changes to the rate reflect a conscious managerial choice. Second, unlike discretionary 
accruals and real activities manipulations, ERRs are directly observable and largely unrelated to 
other dimensions of a firm’s performance that complicate analyses of these other forms of 
earnings management (Bergstresser et al., 2006). Finally, because ERRs are directly related to 
labor costs, aggressive ERR assumptions represent a transfer of assets from one stakeholder 
group (i.e., employees) to the firm’s earnings, which potentially benefits other stakeholders (e.g., 
shareholders, executives) (Comprix & Muller, 2011). Unlike in other contexts where we see this 
tradeoff, such as layoffs (Jung, 2014) and employee benefit changes (Cobb, 2015), the ERR 
transfer is largely unrelated to the operational strategy or performance of the firm.5  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, STAKEHOLDER POWER,  
AND PENSION RETURN ASSUMPTIONS 
Corporate governance concerns “the structure of rights and responsibilities among the 
parties with a stake in the firm” (Aoki, 2001: 11). While in practice corporate governance 
involves balancing the interests of various stakeholders, including shareholders, management, 
and labor (Aguilera et al., 2008; Blair & Roe, 1999), the primary focus of most governance 
research is on the methods shareholders use to discipline management. The core problem 
motivating most of this work is that because the actions and interests of executives often conflict 
                                                          
5 Executives could use the extra earnings generated from an ERR increase to finance its strategic endeavors (see 
Bergstresser et al., 2006).  
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with those of shareholders, shareholders rely on various internal and external control 
mechanisms to monitor and incentivize executives to act in accordance with their demands 
(Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Walsh & Seward, 1990).  
While greatly informing our understanding of governance problems and potential 
solutions, an agency-theoretic focus may overlook some issues confronting executive decision-
makers. First, because of its focus on the bilateral contracts between shareholders and executives, 
agency theory typically overlooks other stakeholder claims on the firm’s resources. In particular, 
in many organizational settings there are multiple sets of residual claimants to whom an 
executive is responsible (Kiser, 1999).6 Goal conflicts, therefore, do not occur simply between 
the agent and the principal. Rather, goal conflicts occur also in situations where an agent must 
“maneuver through the tangled loyalties he or she owes to many different principals and how to 
negotiate through their competing interests…” (Shapiro, 2005: 278). How do agents resolve 
these often-irreconcilable conflicts between multiple principals? 
Prior research has recognized the issue of multiple principals (e.g., Bernheim & 
Whinston, 1986; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002), though most organizational 
research on the topic has examined conflicts between different types of shareholders (see Peng & 
Sauerwald, 2013). In this line of inquiry, researchers emphasize that principal-principal conflicts 
are resolved by various external (e.g., laws) and internal (e.g., voting rights) governance 
mechanisms. In a notable exception, Adams (1996) examined the issue of multiple principals in a 
comparative study of the Dutch and English East India Companies, focusing primarily on how 
their organizational structures affected resource dependencies, thereby affecting relationships 
between principals and between principals and agents.   
In contrast, management scholarship has long advanced the idea that executives often 
face a number of conflicting demands from stakeholders (e.g., Barnard, 1938; Simon, 1947). A 
                                                          
6 Numerous scholars have asserted that viewing shareholders as the sole residual claimant is not justified in the law 
(e.g., Blair & Stout, 1999; Dodd, 1932) and does not reflect organizational realities (e.g., Asher, Mahoney, & 
Mahoney, 2005; Freeman, 1984). 
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negotiation process that occurs between coalitions, which consist of groups of individuals with 
similar interests seeking to have their preferences met by the firm, helps determine a firm’s goals 
and strategies (March, 1962). Coalitions often have divergent interests, and, in most cases, no 
single group is able to determine the goals pursued by the organization. However, what issues 
executives attend to and whose interests are prioritized is determined, in part, by the power and 
influence of the actors (Emerson, 1962; Jackall, 1988). Stakeholder theorists have also argued 
that, when making decisions, executives weigh the interests of various stakeholders based on 
their power, legitimacy, and the urgency of their demands (Mitchell et al., 1997). Therefore, the 
relative power of different stakeholders and changes thereto help determine the outcome of these 
conflicts and should be reflected in the firm’s goals and strategies.  
We see stakeholder conflict clearly in the context of DB pensions. While it is well 
established that executives are agents to shareholders (Fama, 1980) in a DB framework, 
employees are also principals. Pension theory argues that workers effectively forego income in 
the present period, trusting that the firm will manage and appropriately fund the plan and keep its 
promise to pay out the funds as a post-retirement annuity (Kruse, 1995). However, the firm, not 
the worker, owns the pension assets and liabilities (Landsman, 1986). Thus, as Shleifer and 
Summers (1988) argued, ex ante risk sharing between the firm and DB participants can lead to ex 
post opportunistic appropriation because the property rights held by pension participants are 
poorly defined (see also Asher et al., 2005). In sum, since workers entrust the firm with their 
foregone wages and because executives can use excess pension assets for their own ends 
(Ippolito & James, 1992), in a DB arrangement the employee-executive relationship represents a 
context rife with potential principal-agent conflicts (Eaton et al., 2014). 
Prior research has focused chiefly on the executives’ incentives to adjust ERRs for their 
own gain, finding, for example, that ERR increases occur when stock-based CEO compensation 
is higher (Bergstresser et al., 2006) and when the firm is likely to miss analyst estimates (An et 
al., 2014). Because executives are also agents to shareholders who expect that the firm will 
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generate adequate returns to provide them with profit potential, executives may be inclined to 
manipulate the rate to benefit shareholders. In the sections below, however, I argue that 
employees have the ability to mitigate such manipulations and that CEOs may use their 
discretion to act opportunistically in order to appease investors. I also argue that the background 
of the CEO plays a role in determining how firms set their ERRs.  
Employee Power 
Though the corporate governance literature frequently neglects consideration of labor 
(Blair & Roe, 1999), employees can play a key role in the governance process due to their ability 
to influence corporate decision-making and control resources (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Coff, 
1999). In a DB arrangement, firms invest workers’ foregone wages to provide them an 
annuitized income in retirement (Ippolito, 1987). Because compensation tends to spike upward in 
a DB plan as the worker nears retirement (Kotlikoff & Wise, 1985), she has a financial incentive to 
remain in the firm until her benefits have fully vested. Since the firm owns the pension assets, 
workers’ willingness to accept a DB pension necessitates that the explicit terms of the plan be 
matched with an implicit promise of lifetime employment (Lazear, 1986). We can therefore 
consider DB pensions to be both an incomplete contract that confers to workers a residual claim 
on a portion of the firm’s assets and an implicit promise of lifetime employment in exchange for 
effort and loyalty (Gustman, Mitchell, & Steinmeier, 1994).  
By increasing the ERR, executives effectively push out pension costs, thereby increasing 
the amount of funds necessary in the future to match the obligations owed to workers. In so 
doing, the firm increases the probability that it will, in the future, fully renege on its pension 
promise by terminating or freezing its plan (Waring, 2012). Consequently, workers can be 
negatively affected by higher ERRs. Research has found that worker power influences key 
elements of the employment relationship, such as the amount of employment security and 
stability (Bidwell, 2013; Dencker, 2009). As such, I expect that as workers in a firm obtain (lose) 
power, the firm’s ERRs will be lower or higher. 
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Individual employees have little power to influence an organization’s goals and 
strategies, but when workers mobilize and act collectively, their power is greater (Coff, 1999). 
The primary means by which employees do so is via unionization, which provides workers an 
institutionalized apparatus to exert influence on firms by engaging in or threatening strikes and 
slowdowns and by expressing demands through collective bargaining. Evidence has shown that 
unions play a crucial role in how much discretion firms have in structuring their employment 
relationships. For example, unions have been shown to deter the use of contingent employment 
relationships (Gramm & Schnell, 2001) and are associated with longer employment tenure 
(Bidwell, 2013) and improved benefits and wages (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). Though DB 
pensions present a case where younger workers may have interests that conflict with those of 
older employees (Dencker, Joshi, & Martocchio, 2009), in a union setting the interests of the 
average worker predominate. Because the average worker is likely to be older and have higher 
exit costs, when workers bargain collectively they tend to seek more security (Goldberg, 1980), 
which DB pensions are designed to create (Cobb, 2015).  
Labor organizations have also served as important monitors of firms’ employment and 
corporate governance practices, and anecdotal evidence suggests that unions have been 
outspoken against firms’ aggressive ERR assumptions (Solomon & Hawkins, 2005). Moreover, 
firms may be prone to decrease their ERRs prior to labor negotiations to make the plan appear 
more costly and use this a lever when seeking wage and/or benefit concessions (Benmelech, 
Bergman, & Enriquez, 2012). As such, I expect that when workers have greater levels of power 
in a firm, its executives will use less-aggressive ERR assumptions. 
Hypothesis 1: A firm’s level of unionization will be negatively related to its expected rate of 
return on pension assets. 
Shareholder Power and Fiduciary Standards 
Shareholders invest in corporations primarily for economic gain, which comes in the 
form of dividends or by selling part of their interest in the firm for profit. Shareholders, then, 
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make the decision to invest based on the belief that, in the future, the firm will (a) distribute 
some of its returns and/or (b) the value of the firm’s shares will increase, allowing them to profit 
when selling shares (Velasco, 2006). Firms respond to investor pressures because of their ability 
to initiate and engage in various forms of activism (Filatotchev & Toms, 2006) and because the 
liquidation of their shareholdings reduces the value of the company, which raises the cost of 
capital (David, O'Brien, Yoshikawa, & Delios, 2010; Parrino, Sias, & Starks, 2003). Extensive 
research has examined how investors influence executive decision-making in order to enhance 
shareholder returns (e.g., Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, & Hitt, 2010; Useem, 1996). A key finding 
from this work is that the structure of equity ownership helps shape the political dynamics within 
a firm and directly affects its goals and structure (Fiss & Zajac, 2004).  
There are, however, different types of shareholders with different goals, objectives, and 
time horizons (see Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010). In this study, I focus on 
institutional investors. This is the largest class of equity owners in the United States, and a 
category that receives considerable scholarly interest (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 2002; Jung & 
Dobbin, 2014). Notably, in the context of earnings management, some research has argued that 
due to their ability and willingness to monitor management, institutional investors discourage 
accruals management (e.g., Chung, Firth, & Kim, 2002; Hadani, Goranova, & Khan, 2011) and 
ERR increases (Eaton et al., 2014). Others have found, however, a more complex relationship 
between institutional shareholding and earnings management, such as when current shareholders 
benefit from earnings management at the expense of future shareholders (Guthrie & 
Sokolowsky, 2010) or when shareholders have a shorter investment horizon (Koh, 2007).  
As these studies reveal, there are many types of institutional investors—public and 
company pension funds, banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds, for example—that differ 
along a number of attributes. One point of differentiation between them is the stringency of their 
fiduciary responsibilities to clients. Though all institutional investors have discretion over how 
they invest their clients’ assets and are legally considered fiduciaries, the strictness of the 
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standards of prudence differs based on the investors’ legal form (David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 
1998). Prudent-man laws are designed to protect clients by allowing them to seek damages when 
a fiduciary fails to invest in the clients’ best interest. Though institutions typically own a diverse 
array of stocks, court rulings stipulate that the merits of each stock in the portfolio be assessed 
individually to determine prudence (Badrinath, Gay, & Kale, 1989). As a result, investors held to 
stricter fiduciary standards have a strong incentive to protect themselves from liability by tilting 
their portfolios toward firms with better current-earnings performance, which the courts often 
use to determine the prudence of an investment (Del Guercio, 1996).  
Not surprisingly, research has shown that institutional investors with stricter fiduciary 
standards are more sensitive to the short-term earnings performance of the individual stocks in 
their portfolio (e.g., Bushee, 2001). Since the benefit of increasing the ERR is an immediate 
enhancement of current-year earnings, I expect that the stringency of fiduciary standards will 
play a key role in how executives set the ERR. While I do not necessarily expect that 
shareholders specifically request that a firm raise its ERR, when shareholders value near-term 
returns and directly or indirectly pressure firms to provide it, I expect that manipulating their 
pension assumptions is a tactic firms will be more apt to use. 
To test the impact of fiduciary restrictions on ERRs, I split institutions into five groups 
based on their legal form — investment advisors (including mutual funds), insurance companies, 
bank trusts, public pension funds, and company pension funds — as prior research has found 
significant differences across these classifications for preferences for current earnings 
(Abarbanell, Bushee, & Raedy, 2003). Investment advisors primarily manage individual 
investments through mutual funds. While the Model Prudent Investment Act of 1940 imposes a 
fiduciary responsibility on mutual fund managers, it makes no reference to prudent investments. 
Therefore these managers are held to the least-restrictive fiduciary responsibilities among 
institutional investors, granting them great latitude in selecting firms in which to invest (Del 
Guercio, 1996). Insurance companies hold equities as an investment vehicle for their premiums. 
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Compared to mutual funds, insurance companies are subject to stricter fiduciary constraints; 
however, these restraints are still relaxed when compared to those for banks and pension funds.  
The three types of institutions with the most stringent fiduciary standards are bank trusts, 
public pension funds, and company pension funds. Bank trusts manage equities on behalf of 
other institutions, including pension funds and endowments, and face particularly strict fiduciary 
requirements that motivate them to avoid investments the courts would deem imprudent 
(Badrinath et al., 1989). Because current-earnings performance is the key criteria used to 
determine the prudence of an investment, banks should find firms with better near-term earnings 
performance to be safer, and thus more attractive, investments. In fact, Del Guercio (1996) found 
that bank trust managers invest more heavily in stocks with a better Standard & Poor’s Earnings 
and Dividend Ranking — a measure often used in courts to defend a stock investment as prudent 
— while mutual fund managers do not. Similarly, Bushee (2001) found that equity ownership by 
bank trusts is associated with a preference for near-term earnings over long-run value. Therefore, 
firms with a higher percentage of bank ownership may feel heightened pressure to continue solid 
earnings performance given the risk of such investors liquidating their holdings.  
Public pension funds, as retirement vehicles for public-sector workers, also face strict 
fiduciary responsibilities under the state and local laws governing their investment operations 
(Shin & Seo, 2011). Research has found that the fear of litigation is a particularly strong 
motivating investment criterion for public pension managers (O'Barr & Conley, 1992). Similarly, 
under the Employment Retirement Investment Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), managers of 
company pension funds are personally liable for losses on imprudent investments. Thus both 
public and company pension fund managers have a strong incentive to invest in safe, high-
quality stocks (Bushee, 2001; Del Guercio, 1996). In sum, based on their more stringent 
fiduciary standards, we should expect that as the percentage of a firm’s shares owned by public 
or company pension funds increases, the firm will be more willing to increase its ERR to 
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maintain or improve earnings. Doing so makes the firm a more attractive investment and lowers 
the probability that these investors will liquidate their holdings.  
Nevertheless, prior research has contended that pension funds are a more patient form of 
capital with a longer-term investment horizon (Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003), and 
ownership by these funds is associated with firms that are more socially responsible (Johnson & 
Greening, 1999). Pension funds also prefer CEO pay to be tied less closely to firm performance 
as such linkages might encourage unnecessary risk taking and earnings management (Shin & 
Seo, 2011). It is also possible that pension fund managers hold a more conservative view toward 
earnings garnered from pension changes. These managers may be better informed about the 
impact of ERR increases and are thus more effective monitors of firms’ pension plans. The study 
of pension manipulations, therefore, presents a unique context to examine how pension fund 
ownership affects executive decision-making.  
More generally, one might expect investors to discount any returns garnered through 
ERR increases. A number of studies have found, however, that investors do not effectively 
assess the impact of pension accounting on firm value. For example, Coronado and Sharpe 
(2003) found that earnings due to changed pension assumptions were capitalized into share 
prices in a manner equivalent to operating earnings (see also Picconi, 2006). In a related vein, 
Franzoni and Marin (2006) found that firms with underfunded pension plans are overvalued by 
the market, as investors do not anticipate the impact of pension liabilities on future earnings. The 
accounting literature surmises that the complexity of pension accounting, where much of the 
pertinent information is embedded in footnotes, makes it challenging for investors to effectively 
value plan changes (Coronado, Mitchell, Sharpe, & Nesbitt, 2008; Picconi, 2006). It is also 
plausible that investors that place greater value on firms with better current earnings performance 
are relatively indifferent to earnings generated from pension changes versus operations. 
Despite their transitory impact on reported income and the often arbitrary nature in which 
these assumptions are set, higher ERRs are associated with increased earnings and share prices, 
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providing such shareholders with greater profit potential—at least in short-run (Coronado & 
Sharpe, 2003). Based on the stringency of fiduciary standards for banks, public pension funds, 
and company pension funds, I expect that firms with higher levels of ownership by these 
institutions will be more compelled to increase their ERRs.  
Hypothesis 2: A firm’s level of institutional ownership by (a) bank trusts, (b) public pension 
funds, and (c) company pension funds will be positively related to its expected rate of return on 
pension assets. 
Though I do not hypothesize a relationship between insurance companies and investment 
advisors on the one hand and ERR changes on the other, I control for these investor types in my 
analyses. These controls can be viewed as a benchmark to test whether fiduciary standards are a 
determinant of institutional investor preferences for near-term earnings (Bushee, 2001). 
CEO Background and Decision-Making 
Equity owners of large corporations typically delegate control over firm resources to 
management. While constraints on their discretion exist, by the nature of their position top 
executives have substantial authority to set firms’ goals and strategies (Fligstein, 1991; Graffin, 
Boivie, & Carpenter, 2013). Thus, while complex organizations are composed of stakeholder 
groups with competing interests vying for resources and attention, the arbiters of much of this 
conflict in modern corporations are executive decision-makers (Longo, 2000).  
The literature on earnings management has focused considerable attention on CEO 
incentives to manage earnings, finding, for example, that CEOs are more willing to manage 
accruals when they receive greater levels of performance-based compensation (Zhang, Bartol, 
Smith, Pfarrer, & Khanin, 2008) or in order to secure permanent employment (Chen, Luo, Tang, 
& Tong, 2015). Similarly, prior research on pension-assumption manipulations has focused on 
CEO incentives to manipulate the ERR, finding that ERR increases occur when stock-based 
CEO compensation is higher (Bergstresser et al., 2006) and when the firm is likely to miss 
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analyst estimates (An et al., 2014). In this study, I complement and extend this prior work by 
examining how the background of CEOs affects their willingness to change the ERR.  
When faced with similar circumstances, different executives may make substantially 
different decisions based on their individual understanding of those situations. As such, firm-
level characteristics and outcomes can be linked, in part, to the experiences and schemas of 
senior executives (see Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). Executive beliefs about the 
most effective tactics and strategies are likely to emerge from prior experience (Skinner, 1953), 
as prior training and experience have an enduring effect on an individual’s cognition and 
decision-making schemas (Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). The functional 
background of a firm’s top executive, therefore, is likely to play a role in determining how 
conflicts between various stakeholders are resolved and hence in setting the objectives and 
strategies of the firm (Fligstein, 1990; Ocasio & Kim, 1999).  
CEOs with a background in finance are of particular interest to the study of ERRs, as 
there are at least two explanations for why such CEOs might be more likely than others to 
manipulate this rate. First, training and early career experience in finance are thought to affect 
CEOs’ commitment to the primacy of markets and the belief that shareholders are the sole 
stakeholder to whom the firm is beholden (Fiss & Zajac, 2004). A shareholder primacy view 
may encourage a shorter investment time horizon and provide a justification for maximizing 
rents to equity holders by reducing rents to labor and other stakeholders (Goldstein, 2012). 
Because finance CEOs tend to hold such a view, they are thought to view labor as a cost to be 
minimized (Fligstein & Shin, 2007), and research has found that CEOs with a background in 
finance are more likely to engage in downsizing (Budros, 2000; Jung, 2014). Hence, theory 
suggests that executives with a background in finance will hold a positive view toward 
minimizing a firm’s long-term obligations to its workers as the demands and concerns of workers 
are likely to be viewed as less salient (Bundy, Shropshire, & Buchholtz, 2013).  
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Second, evidence suggests also that CEOs with a background in finance are more 
financially sophisticated—more specifically, they have been found to be better able to raise 
external capital, less likely to hold cash, more likely to issue debt, and are thought to follow more 
aggressive financial policies (Custodio & Metzger, 2014). Thus, in addition to their proclivity to 
put the interests of shareholders ahead of those of other stakeholders, one might expect CEOs 
with a background in finance to have a greater awareness and understanding of the consequences 
of raising a firm’s ERR and to see this as a way to manage earnings without the risk of 
impropriety. Altogether, given their predisposition toward a market orientation and attention to 
financial measures of performance, as well as their greater knowledge and understanding of 
financial instruments, I expect that when a firm has a finance CEO, its ERR will be higher.  
Hypothesis 3: Compared to firms with CEOs that have other functional backgrounds, the 
presence of a CEO with a background in finance will be positively related to its expected rate of 
return on pension assets.  
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample 
Because my central interest is examining the drivers of firms’ ERRs, I focused my 
analysis on large US firms that had a DB plan during the period of study. Though it is also 
important to understand trends in the retirement plan use of all firms, I focused on larger firms 
during this period because they were most likely to have DB pensions and were most subject to 
changes in the competitive and ideological landscape that might motivate their use of pension 
assumptions as a form of earnings management.  
The common practice among researchers of drawing their samples from a single year 
when studying large firms can create survivorship bias. Because this study covers a long period 
that saw a great deal of turnover among the largest firms (Davis & Stout, 1992), I wanted to 
capture the relevant dynamics by sampling from multiple points in time. I originally began my 
analysis by examining the years 1986 to 2006—a choice motivated by the fact that new Financial 
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Accounting Standards Board (FASB) guidelines were passed in 1985, making 1986 the first year 
in which a change in pension assumptions under the new guidelines could have occurred. The 
initial sample included all publicly traded firms that had a DB plan and were included on the 
1986 Fortune 500 list of largest industrials, the 1995 Fortune 1000 list, or the Fortune 500 list for 
2007. This selection generated an unbalanced sample of 938 firms. However, because some of 
the CEO data were available from only 1992 onward, the primary analyses I present here use 
data for 1992 to 2006 only, yielding an unbalanced sample of 728 firms. I did run, however, 
models without the CEO variables for the full complement of years and discuss those results 
below. These analyses are available upon request.  
Variables 
Expected rate of return. My dependent variable is the expected rate of return on pension 
assets. The ERR data come from two sources: Form 5500 reports and Compustat. Each year, 
firms offering retirement plans to their workers must submit a Form 5500 report that details 
information about the plan. I had a small number of instances in which the ERRs for a firm’s 
different plans were not the same. In these instances, I used the rate of the largest plan. One of 
the challenges with using the Form 5500 is missing data, that is, there are a number of 
observations each year for which the ERR is not available. I therefore supplemented these data 
with data from Compustat, which has information on firm ERRs beginning in 1991. For ease of 
interpretation, I multiplied the ERR by 100 and presented the ERR in basis points. 
Unionization. I included a measure of employee power, unionization, which is the 
percentage of a firm’s DB participants covered by collectively bargained plans. These data come 
from the Form 5500 reports, which include a field indicating whether a pension plan is part of a 
collective bargaining agreement. Unions often stipulate that some firm decisions, particularly 
those directly affecting employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement, require union 
participation (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). Collectively bargained plans, therefore, limit the ability 
of firms to modify the plan’s terms unilaterally. I note here that in some cases workers in a firm 
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may be represented by a union but are not participants in a collectively bargained plan. In other 
instances, not all workers participating in a collectively bargained plan may be part of the union,  
as if any part of a pension plan is covered in a collectively bargained agreement then it is 
considered a unionized plan. Given these potential issues, I also used the rate of unionization in 
the firm’s focal industry and the results are similar to those presented below.  
Institutional share ownership. For each firm in each year, I took the percentage of the 
total number of shares outstanding for the focal firm owned by institutional investors as 
classified in each of the different types: Bank, Public Pension, Company Pension, Insurance 
Company, and Investment Advisor.7 Unlike measures of overall institutional share ownership, 
these measures have the advantage of assuming that institutional investors’ interests, and their 
influence on firm strategies, vary based upon fiduciary standards. The data come from Bushee 
(1998) and are lagged one year. 
CEO background. The functional background of CEOs was coded manually based on 
their prior work experience. I coded individuals who served in an accounting or finance-related 
position — such as chief financial officer, controller, or treasurer — as a Finance CEO. Because 
the ERR is typically set early in the fiscal year (Picconi, 2006), I considered the CEO of record 
to be the individual working at the end of quarter one of each fiscal year. In the analyses below, I 
compared finance CEOs with all other CEO background types.8 The information was collected 
from Who’s Who in Finance and Industry and supplemented with information from the Dun & 
Bradstreet Reference Book of Corporate Management and company proxy filings.  
Control variables. A firm’s ERR may relate to factors not included in the discussion of 
the hypotheses. To account for firm size, I included the lagged log of Total Assets. I included a 
                                                          
7 There are two other categories of institutional investors: foundations (including universities) and miscellaneous. 
Including these does not materially affect the results.  
8 I also coded four additional CEO background categories: (1) General Management (including operations), (2) 
Sales and Marketing, (3) Engineering and other technical jobs (e.g., chief information officer), and (4) Law. In 
analyses not presented here, I found that, in comparison to all other CEOs, those with a background in law are 
significantly and negatively associated with ERRs. The other CEO background types had no significant effect on 
ERRs and were not significantly different from one another with respect to ERRs.  
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measure of Revenue Growth, a common control in studies of earnings management as it may be 
related to the ability of firms to finance their DB plans. To account for performance, I took the 
company’s previous-year Return on Equity (ROE). Analyses using return on assets yield similar 
results. Because this variable has some extreme values, I winsorized this figure at the 99th and 1st 
percentiles. The employment and financial data come from Compustat. I included a measure of 
Long-term Debt to Total Assets, lagged one year, as a measure of the firm’s relative covenant 
constraints. I also winsorized this figure at the 99th percentile as it contained some extreme 
values at the upper end. The employment and financial data come from Compustat.  
The size of a firm’s pension plan or plans may make it more willing to increase the ERR 
of its pension assets; therefore I also controlled for the size of the firm’s DB pension plan(s) 
using the log total of all of the assets the firm has in its DB plan(s) (DB Assets). I also included a 
measure of the Funding Status of the firms’ pension plan or plans from the previous year. 
Calculated as the ratio of the fair market value of the firm’s pension assets to its projected benefit 
obligations multiplied by 100, the ratio represents whether the firm’s pension plans are 
adequately funded. Executives of firms with a higher funding status ratio may be inclined to raise 
the ERR. Pension-participation, asset, and liability data were taken from the Form 5500 filings 
and Compustat and the operating asset data from Compustat.  
To account for the possibility that other governance mechanisms may affect the 
relationship between the independent variables and ERR increases, I included several control 
variables. First, I include a measure of Shareholder Rights, which measures the number of 
practices the firm adopted that grant (or restrict) shareholder rights. I used the governance index 
(Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003) obtained from the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC) governance database and reverse-coded it such that higher values equal greater 
shareholder rights. I also included a control measure for CEO Tenure, as a CEO might use 
different decision-making criteria as she becomes more experienced. Prior research has also 
shown that CEOs who are more entrenched have greater influence and may be monitored less 
22 
 
rigorously than their less-tenured counterparts (Dikolli, Mayew, & Nanda, 2014). Prior work has 
also found a positive relationship between option-based executive compensation and higher 
ERRs (Bergstresser et al., 2006). Hence, I included the ratio of stock-option pay to total pay 
(CEO Pay from Options) for the firm’s CEO, where the option value is calculated using the 
Black-Scholes methodology of valuation. For robustness, I also examined the log value of 
options; the impact on the hypothesized covariates was immaterial. The CEO pay and tenure data 
come from the Compustat Executive Compensation database. Finally, because the threat of 
acquisition is thought to discipline management (Manne, 1965), to account for the fact that some 
firms face more active acquisition markets, I include a lagged count of mergers and acquisitions 
(Industry Mergers) at the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code level. These 
data come from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum database. 
CEOs have strong incentives to report earnings that match or exceed those expected by 
analysts, as missing an earnings target has negative consequences for the firm’s stock price and 
CEO compensation (Skinner & Sloan, 2002). Though Picconi (2006) found that the ERR is set at 
the beginning of the fiscal year typically, thus making pension assumptions an imperfect tool to 
manage earnings, An et al. (2014) found evidence that firms do increase the ERR to make their 
reported earnings meet or exceed analyst forecasts. To account for this possibility, I included two 
control variables. The first is a binary indicator, Missed Earnings, which is equal to 1 when the 
firm missed its earnings target for the year. This is calculated by subtracting the firm’s reported 
earnings per share (EPS) from the median analyst forecast for the year.  
The second indicator, Avoid Missed Earnings, is set to 1 when the firm met or exceeded 
its earnings forecast but would not have had it not increased its ERR. Following the procedure 
used by An et al. (2014), I calculated an adjusted EPS using the following formula: 
𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑺𝑺′ = 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑺𝑺 − [(∆ 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 * FVPA * (1-MTR)] / # of common shares outstanding 
where EPS is the reported earnings per share, ∆ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 is the change in the firm’s ERR from the 
previous year, FVPA is the fair value of pension assets, and MTR is the marginal tax rate. This 
23 
 
yields an estimate of the firm’s EPS had it not changed its ERR. I subtracted from this figure the 
median analyst earnings estimate to determine whether the firm would have missed its estimate 
had its ERR not changed. When a firm made its earnings estimate but would not have had the 
ERR remained unchanged, Avoid Missed Earnings, was coded 1. The ERR and pension asset 
data were taken from the Form 5500 and Compustat. The marginal tax rate data were taken from 
Blouin et al. (2010), the EPS and common share data from Compustat, and the median analyst 
forecast data from Thomson Reuters’ Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES) database.  
Additionally, I controlled for the possible effect of the retirement practices of industry 
peers on a firm’s retirement policy by creating the variable Industry Average ERR. This figure 
represents the average ERR among firms in my sample sharing the same two-digit SIC code. To 
account for unobserved effects that may matter for a given year, I controlled for time using year 
dummy codes. Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 1. 
[--- Insert Table 1 about here ---] 
Analytic Approach 
In this study, the unit of analysis is the firm and the unit of observation is the firm year. 
To examine the relationship between ERRs and the covariates, I used a pooled time-series 
regression analysis with firm fixed effects. A fixed-effects model accounts for firms’ unobserved 
characteristics that do not vary over time that may affect ERRs. This specification is achieved by 
subtracting the values of each observation from the firm mean, removing all between-firm 
differences, and leaving only within-firm variation to be explained by the covariates. 
Specifically, I estimated the effects of the covariates on ERRs as follows: 
𝒀𝒀𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 =  𝜷𝜷𝟎𝟎 +  𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑿𝑿𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 +  … + 𝜷𝜷𝒑𝒑𝑿𝑿𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 +  𝜶𝜶𝒊𝒊 +  𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 
where all firm-specific effects are accommodated by αj and within-firm effects are explained by 
the covariates. A fixed-effects framework strengthens the inferences about the effects the 
covariates have on ERRs by ruling out the possibility that firms that adopted those rates had 
stable unobserved preferences for their value. Furthermore, because fixed effects allow for the 
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correlation between αj and all Xij, whereas a random effect does not, under most conditions a 
fixed effect is considered to be a more convincing estimation method (Wooldridge, 2006). A 
Hausman test indicated that the fixed-effects model was appropriate (χ2 = 47.32, p < .01). Using 
variance inflation factor tests, I found that multi-collinearity was not an issue.  
RESULTS 
 The results of the fixed-effects regressions are in Table 2. Model 1 contains the results 
for the independent variables. In Model 2, I included only the control variables. Model 3 shows 
the results of the full model. Across models, several control variables are significantly related to 
ERRs. ROE has a modestly significant and negative impact on ERR changes across models, 
suggesting that when a firm’s financial performance wanes its executives increase the ERR. The 
funding status of the plan is negatively related to ERRs at the .10 level in Model 2 but is 
insignificant once the full model is specified. Shareholder rights are also negatively and 
significantly related to ERRs, suggesting that as firms adopt mechanisms that curtail managerial 
discretion, their ERRs decline. CEO tenure is positively and significantly related to ERRs, 
suggesting that as executives gain experience and become more entrenched in their role, they are 
more likely to increase the ERR. The results indicate that executives are significantly more likely 
to increase the ERR when doing so allows the firm to avoid missing its earnings target. Finally, 
firms in industries with higher ERRs in the previous year are also likely to increase their ERR. 
[--- Insert Table 2 about here ---] 
Because employees have an interest in ensuring their pension benefits remain stable and 
secure, I predicted that employee power would be negatively associated with ERRs. Lending 
support for Hypothesis 1, the results in Models 1 and 3 show a significant, negative relationship 
between unionization and ERRs. I also ran analyses with a binary indicator as to whether the 
firm has at least one collectively bargained plan, and those results were significant and negative 
as well. It is important to note that for firms with at least one unionized plan, on average 45% of 
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its DB participants are members of a collectively bargained plan. Therefore, the presence of a 
collectively bargained plan in a firm helps participants in non-unionized DB plans.  
Hypotheses 2a, b, and c predicted a positive relationship between equity ownership in the 
previous year by bank trusts, public pension funds, and company pension funds, respectively, 
and ERRs. Across models, the results indicate that the percentage of ownership by banks is 
positively associated with ERR increases, lending credence to the argument that when a firm has 
a higher percentage of its shares owned by investors with stronger fiduciary standards, its 
executives seek to enhance current earnings performance by increasing the ERR. Hypothesis 2a 
is therefore supported. Supporting Hypothesis 2b, the results also indicate a significant and 
positive relationship for public pension fund ownership and ERRs. While consistent with the 
theory that more stringent fiduciary standards motivate investors to prefer that firms report 
higher near-term earnings—as such firms are deemed to be prudent investments—this finding 
runs counter to previous work that argues that pension funds have a longer-term investment 
horizon. I take up this point further in the discussion.  
In contrast to the results from banks and public pension funds, in Model 1 there is a 
negative and significant relationship between share ownership by company pension funds and 
ERRs, which runs counter to Hypothesis 2c. However, once the full model is specified, the effect 
is insignificant. While Hypothesis 2c is not supported, these results may suggest that, despite 
their commensurate fiduciary responsibilities, company pension funds hold a more conservative 
view toward earnings garnered from ERR increases than do banks or public pension funds. In 
analyses from 1986 to 2006 without the CEO covariates, the effects for unionization and equity 
ownership by bank trusts, public pension funds, and company pension funds are substantively 
the same as those presented here.  
Hypothesis 3 predicted that, compared to other CEOs, the presence of a CEO with a 
finance background will be positively related to ERRs. Confirming this hypothesis, the results 
support the argument that because finance CEOs have a preference to maximize short-term 
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earnings and/or are more financially sophisticated, they are more willing to increase ERRs. 
These findings reinforce those from other studies that suggest that finance CEOs make decisions 
that favor shareholder welfare over that of other constituents (e.g., Budros, 2000; Jung, 2014).  
Supplemental Analyses 
 In observational studies of this type, establishing causality between the covariates and the 
dependent variable can present a significant challenge, and I am aware of concerns about 
endogeneity affecting these results along with any inferences made about causality. I attempted 
to deal with these concerns empirically using three different analyses: an error-correction model, 
a two-stage least-squares analysis, and a triple-difference analysis.   
Error-correction model. I first attempted to address endogeneity concerns using an 
autoregressive analysis: the single-equation error-correction model (ECM). The single-equation 
ECM used in the analyses is specified as follows:  
∆𝒀𝒀𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 =  𝜶𝜶𝟎𝟎 + 𝜶𝜶𝟏𝟏,𝒊𝒊 +  𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏∆𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 −  𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐∆𝜸𝜸,𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 + 𝜷𝜷3∆𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 +  𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 
where ∆Yt denotes the first difference of the dependent variable (Yt – Yt-1); α0 denotes the grand 
mean; α1,j denotes firm-year deviation; β1 denotes the contemporaneous coefficient, which 
absorbs any endogenous relationship between the explanatory covariate and the dependent 
variable; β2 denotes the error correction rate of Y; and β3 denotes the impact of Xt-1 on ∆Yt. I 
identified the relationship between the covariates and ERRs by estimating the effect of the 
variables on future ERRs, holding the past ERRs and concurrent changes in the covariates 
constant. Therefore, any concurrent endogenous association between the covariates and ERRs is 
accounted for in β1, which is not used to identify the causal relation between the covariates and 
ERRs. In these models, I included dummy codes for the two-digit SIC code of the focal firm.  
Though I ran analyses on the full complement of controls, because of the large number of 
variables in the ECM, I included only the results of the hypothesized covariates in Table 3. The 
full model is available upon request. The results in Model 4 largely reinforce the fixed-effects 
results with two important exceptions. Though the short-run impact of public pension fund 
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ownership is positive and significant, the long-run effect of public pension fund ownership is not, 
suggesting only a modest effect of public pension ownership on ERRs. Furthermore, consistent 
with the findings from Model 1, the results also indicate a negative and significant long-run 
effect between company pension fund ownership and ERRs. While I cannot completely rule out 
concerns of endogeneity because the ECM takes into account the impact of past ERRs and 
changes in the covariates, I am more confident that the relationships hypothesized here work in 
the theorized direction and are not correlational or the result of reverse causality.  
[--- Insert Table 3 about here ---] 
Two-stage least-squares model. To attempt to address any concern that bank, public 
pension fund, and company pension fund ownership shares are endogenous with the dependent 
variable, I used a set of two-stage least-squares (2SLS) models with fixed effects. In a traditional 
ordinary least-squares framework, there is a basic assumption that the error term is independent 
of the predictor variables. 2SLS helps correct issues that arise when this assumption is violated. 
In the first stage of the analysis, the endogenous regressor is regressed on the instrument variable 
(IV) and the covariates, which isolates the variation in the predictor that is not correlated with the 
error term. The fitted value from the first stage is then used in the second stage in place of the 
endogenous regressor, allowing us to interpret the coefficient of the endogenous regressor as 
“capturing a covariate-adjusted causal effect” (Bascle, 2008: 294; Wooldridge, 2006).  
I used the number of Analysts covering a firm in the previous year as an IV for 
institutional ownership. While the number of analysts covering a firm helps predict institutional 
ownership (Cornett, Marcus, Saunders, & Tehranian, 2007), I do not expect it to be influenced 
by firms’ pension policies. That is, I expect that analyst coverage will be correlated with share 
ownership by bank trusts, public pension funds, and company pension funds, but the number of 
analysts covering a firm should not be subject to reverse feedback from variations in a firm’s 
ERR. Prior research has used the number of analysts as an IV to predict the impact of 
institutional ownership on firm performance (Cornett et al., 2007) and opportunistic ERR 
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increases (Eaton et al., 2014). One of the limitations here, however, is that I have three categories 
of institutional investors but must use this IV for each type. Hence, I ran separate regressions 
analyzing one investor type at a time with the number of stock analysts as the IV.  
[--- Insert Table 4 about here ---] 
The results of the 2SLS regressions appear in Models 5 through 7 in Table 4. As the 
results indicate, the relationship between bank (Model 5) and public pension fund (Model 6) 
share ownership remains positive and significant. However, in the second stage of these models, 
the unionization and finance CEO variables are insignificant. Several other control variables that 
were previously significant—including ROE, shareholder rights, CEO tenure, and—are also 
insignificant in Model 6. It is possible that the lost efficiency inherent in these analyses has 
affected the relationships between these other covariates and the dependent variable (Bascle, 
2008). If so, a more strongly identified model would likely improve these results.9 In Model 7, 
the results for company pension fund ownership remain insignificant. Though the use of a single 
instrument across the three models is not ideal, the results do offer some confirmation of the 
previous findings regarding bank and public pension fund equity ownership.  
Triple-differences analysis. Difference-in-difference (DD) approaches are a popular way 
to estimate causal effects using observational data. They are particularly useful for estimating the 
effects of policy interventions that do not affect all actors similarly. DD estimation compares the 
differences in outcomes before and after a treatment (first difference) for groups affected by the 
treatment to before-and-after outcomes of groups unaffected by it (second difference). In 
December 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a warning that it might 
challenge ERRs set above 9%. While the warning was issued to all firms, we should expect that 
this intervention would have differentially affected firms’ willingness to lower their ERRs in the 
                                                          
9 I also included the annual average institutional holdings in the industry, excluding the focal firm, for each type of 
institutional investor as a second IV. Prior research has documented a positive correlation between firm-level 
institutional holdings and industry level institutional holdings (Choi & Sias, 2009; David et al., 2010), however, the 
average level of institutional holdings in each firm’s industry is plausibly exogenous to the focal firm’s ERR. These 
instruments, however, were not significant in the first-stage model.  
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years following 2002 based on whether they had an ERR over 9% in 2002. As Figures 1 and 2 
show, there was a marked decline after 2002 in the propensity for firms in my sample to maintain 
an ERR over 9%, and the rate of decline in ERRs for firms with a high ERR was steeper.10   
[--- Insert Figure 1 about here ---] 
[--- Insert Figure 2 about here ---] 
To examine whether the relationships between the hypothesized covariates and ERRs 
were sensitive to this change, I used a triple-differences (i.e., difference-in-difference-in-
difference) design. Specifically, I examined the difference in the observed relationship between 
the bank ownership, public pension fund ownership, and finance CEOs (third differences, 
respectively) on the one hand and ERRs on the other after the treatment (Post-SEC Warning) for 
firms that had and did not have an ERR over 9% (High ERR) in 2002.11 The results of the 2SLS 
models are presented in Models 8 through 12 in Table 5.  
[--- Insert Table 5 about here ---] 
In Model 8, I regressed onto firms’ ERRs all control variables and a dummy code for the 
post-SEC warning, a dummy variable indicating whether a firm had a high ERR in 2002, and an 
interaction of these variables. As expected, the results indicate that after 2002, ERRs decreased 
significantly and this effect was greater for firms that had a high ERR in 2002, indicating that the 
policy had the effect of lowering ERRs, particularly in firms with high ERRs. In Model 9, I 
included the triple difference by interacting rates of bank trust ownership with the high ERR and 
                                                          
10 There was a second significant policy change regarding pension assumptions in 2003. In that year, FASB issued 
SFAS 132R, effective for firms with fiscal years ending after December 15, 2003, that required companies to 
disclose how their pension assets were being invested across four broad investment classes (i.e., equities, bonds, real 
estate, and other). I cannot rule out the possibility that the effects I show for the SEC warning are not due to firms 
anticipating SFAS 132R or firms anticipated the SEC warning in 2001 or in early 2002. There are two potential 
implications. First, if firms anticipated the SEC warning some time during 2001 or early 2002, there would be 
measurement error in my proxies, thereby reducing the power of my tests. Second, I cannot differentiate the effect of 
the SEC warning from SFAS 132R. Other studies have shown that SFAS 132R had an effect on ERR changes 
beyond that of the SEC warning (e.g., Chuk, 2013). However, my goal is not to test the efficacy of a specific 
intervention but instead examine how my covariates affect the willingness of firms to lower their ERRs in the wake 
of a set of policy interventions designed to scrutinize more heavily firms’ pension accounting decisions. 
11 I do not include results on unionization, as there were too few unionized firms in my sample with high ERRs in 
2002. The results for unionization, which are available upon request, showed no significant effects. 
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post-SEC warning indicators. The positive and modestly significant coefficient suggests that for 
firms with a high ERR in 2002, those with higher rates of bank ownership had a less pronounced 
reaction to the SEC warning. Despite facing a strong incentive to lower their ERRs, firms with 
higher rates of bank ownership lowered their ERRs to a lesser extent.  
In Models 10 through 12, I repeat the same steps for public and company pension fund 
share ownership and finance CEOs, respectively. In Model 10, there is a positive and significant 
coefficient for the triple difference with public pension fund ownership, indicating that higher 
rates of public pension fund ownership led firms with a high ERR in 2002 to respond less 
aggressively to the SEC warning. In Model 11, the three-way interaction with company pension 
fund ownership was not significant. However, the significant interaction between company 
pension fund share ownership and the SEC warning indicates that as the percentage of a firm’s 
equity owned by company pension plans increased, it was more likely to lower its ERR after the 
SEC warning irrespective of having a high ERR in 2002. In Model 12, I tested the triple-
difference for finance CEOs. I interacted the finance CEO, high ERR, and post-SEC warning 
indicators. Similar to the results for bank trust and public pension fund ownership, firms with a 
finance CEO and a high ERR in 2002 decreased their ERRs in subsequent years to a lesser 
degree than did firms with a non-finance CEO.   
Though this intervention is not a pure experiment, as a firm’s choice of ERR in 2002 was 
not exogenous, it allowed me to examine whether institutional ownership and CEO background 
differentially affected the response of firms with a high ERR in 2002 to the SEC warning. Taken 
together, these results show that, despite a strong incentive to lower the ERR, executives did so 
to a lesser degree when their firms had higher rates of ownership by bank trusts and public 
pension funds and when they had a finance CEO, thereby providing additional insight on the 
purported causal relationship between these variables and ERRs.   
DISCUSSION 
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 In recent years, a major issue facing many corporations is paying for their past promises. 
One salient example of this has occurred in the employment relationship, where promises of 
lifetime employment and post-retirement income have slowly eroded due to factors like 
technological advancement, globalization, and financial market pressures (Cappelli, 1999). 
Despite these changing realities, however, many firms still confront these old commitments and 
their concomitant financial obligations.  
We see this dilemma clearly with DB pensions. A DB plan allows firms to remunerate 
workers in the future for labor exerted in the present. For such plans to work, however, two 
things are required. First, the worker must believe she will keep her job long enough to receive 
the maximum return on the benefits. A pension plan, therefore, necessitates an implicit promise 
of continued employment that incentivizes workers to accept a future benefit in lieu of wages in 
the present (Lazear, 1986). Second, workers must believe that the money will be there when they 
retire, which requires that firms have a means through which to pay for these distant benefits 
with current contributions and the earnings on those contributions. The ERR is a key financial 
technology that has given firms the ability to accomplish this second goal. Because the ERR is 
sensitive to manipulation, firm stakeholders are incentivized to influence its value for their 
advantage. The purpose of this study was to examine whether stakeholder power dynamics and 
CEO decision-making schemas influenced how executives adjudicated between the demands of 
two principals with conflicting interests as evidenced by firms’ ERRs on pension assets.  
Drawing insights from socio-political theories of the firm, power-dependence 
perspectives, stakeholder theory, and the literature on corporate governance, I argued that when 
executives serve as agents to two principals with conflicting interests, power dynamics and 
executives’ functional expertise influence which principal receives priority. The findings provide 
support for most hypotheses, showing first that a firm’s level of unionization is negatively 
associated with ERRs. Though the literature has traditionally overlooked the importance of labor 
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in corporate governance (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003), the results here point to the key role 
employee power plays in affecting corporate decision-making. 
The results of most models examining the effect of bank trust and public pension fund 
ownership showed each was positively associated with firms’ ERRs. Prior research has 
substantiated that these institutional investors have strong incentives to invest in firms with better 
current-earnings performance. This set of findings lends support for the claim that when 
investors with higher fiduciary standards own a greater proportion of a firm’s equity, firm 
executives seek ways to boost firm earnings by increasing ERRs. The result for public pensions 
is particularly interesting given that such owners are often characterized as having a longer-term 
investment horizon and as preferring firm strategies that consider broader stakeholder interests. It 
is possible, therefore, that the depiction of public pension funds as having a long-term orientation 
is inaccurate. Bushee (2004) found that, compared to banks, insurance companies, and 
investment advisors, pension funds have the second highest percentage of short-term investors 
(30%) and are tied for the lowest percentage of long-term investors (7%). His results suggest that 
the categorization of public pension funds as holding a long-term orientation belies greater 
complexity in their investment time horizons.  
It is also possible that their longer-term orientation is limited to specific situations. Prior 
studies substantiating that pension funds are patient capital have examined outcomes such as 
corporate social responsibility (Johnson & Greening, 1999), international diversification 
(Tihanyi et al., 2003), and innovation (Hoskisson et al., 2002), all of which represent relatively 
fundamental changes to a firm’s strategy with an uncertain impact on future earnings. In 
comparison, ERR changes are largely unrelated to the firm’s operational strategy and lead 
directly to increased earnings in the present period. Firms and public pension fund managers may 
see increasing ERRs as a relatively benign strategy that enhances near-term earnings, features 
that make the firm a more prudent investment and potentially more appealing to such investors.  
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My results also show that company pension fund ownership has no significant effect on 
ERRs. Though one must exercise caution when attempting to draw inferences from null findings, 
these results may suggest that, at least as it pertains to pension assumptions, other criteria than 
short-term earnings maximization are considered by such investors. Finally, although agency 
theory tends to treat agents’ interests as uniform, the results here point to the important role 
played by executive background in affecting those interests. In particular, my findings support 
the idea that the functional background of a firm’s CEO affects how conflicts between 
stakeholders are resolved, as the interests of CEOs with a background in finance seem more 
closely aligned with those of investors preferring better current-earnings performance. 
This study contributes to organizational theory in two key ways. First, by combining 
insights from socio-political, stakeholder, and power-dependence theories (Cyert & March, 
1963; Mitchell et al., 1997; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), I present a fuller picture of the manifold 
and often competing demands CEOs face and how these get resolved. Corporate governance 
research normally highlights the tensions between shareholders and executives and the various 
mechanisms used to align their interests. I sought to complement and extend this research by 
analyzing the impact of stakeholder influence in a context where the interests of the three key 
organizational stakeholders—employees, shareholders, and executives—were likely to conflict. 
In particular, because DB pensions grant poorly defined property rights to workers, these 
pensions are subject to ex post opportunism by executives (Shleifer & Summers, 1988). By 
treating employees and shareholders as principals, differentiating shareholders by their fiduciary 
responsibilities, and considering how the functional expertise of CEOs informs how they 
adjudicate between employee and shareholder interests, I attempt to answer recent calls for 
corporate governance research to attend to the complexity associated with managing multiple 
stakeholders (Tihanyi, Graffin, & George, 2014).  
Second and relatedly, a key challenge in researching how the differing interests of 
employees and shareholders are resolved is identifying and examining firm-level contexts where 
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these conflicts manifest. A handful of noteworthy studies have analyzed such conflicts by 
studying outcomes such as managerial employment relationships and layoffs (e.g., Goldstein, 
2012; Jung, 2014). By extending this work to the study of pension assumptions, I examined a 
context in which the interests of investors with stronger fiduciary responsibilities and finance 
CEOs are in conflict with those of workers, yet the conflict is largely unrelated to the operating 
performance of the firm. To illustrate, we can take the study of layoffs. While the detrimental 
impact of layoffs on affected workers is palpable, the logic undergirding that decision (even if 
proven inaccurate) is typically to make the firm more efficient and profitable (Hallock, 2009). 
Hence, it is difficult to separate the operational impetus for layoffs from their impact on the 
workforce. Aggressive ERRs, on the other hand, effectively transfer money that would have 
gone into the retirement plan into firm earnings yet are largely disconnected from the firm’s 
operating performance. Though I cannot discern an executive’s intentions behind changing the 
firm’s ERR, the distinction between operational and financial decisions is important because it 
eliminates some of the confounding factors that might explain an executive’s decision to 
privilege the interests of one stakeholder group over another.  
Additionally, this study complements and extends recent research on DB plan 
participation. Cobb (2015) found that the desire to reduce the financial uncertainty of DB 
arrangements was a major factor in firms’ decisions to decrease the size of their plans. Large-
scale surveys have suggested that firms’ desire to amend their retirement plans is primarily in 
response to concerns over the volatility of plan costs (Hewitt Associates, 2003; Towers Watson, 
2010; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008). In this study, I show that employee power, 
equity ownership structures, and CEO backgrounds help create that uncertainty (Waring, 2012). 
That is, when the ERR is greater than the actual rate of return, the firm must make up for this 
shortfall over time with increased contributions. Because higher ERRs make future pension costs 
more uncertain, this study suggests that stakeholder conflict helps establish the conditions under 
which firms are motivated to eventually shrink the size of their DB plans.  
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This study also contributes to the broader literature on ERRs as an earnings management 
tool. Prior research on this topic has largely focused on executives’ incentives for amending the 
rate. In this study, I argue and find support for the claim that employee and shareholder interests, 
as well as the decision-making schemas of CEOs, are also factors that influence the rate at which 
a firm sets its ERR. In so doing, this study has implications for policy. Company pension funds 
hold trillions of dollars in investments and millions of workers currently or in the future will rely 
on these funds as a key source of post-retirement income. Given the increasing problems faced 
within the DB pension system in the United States, it is beneficial to know which factors are 
associated with better or worse management and funding of these plans (Eaton et al., 2014).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 One limitation is that I do not have data on other employment rewards such as wages and 
other fringe benefits. Therefore, it is possible that as firms increase their ERRs, the proceeds are 
used to remunerate workers in other ways, such as increasing wages or paying for rising health 
insurance premiums. There is no evidence from the literature on DB plan terminations and 
freezes that suggests that the altering of firm retirement plans led to greater worker remuneration. 
Though the compensating differential rationale for ERR increases seems unlikely, I cannot rule it 
out. Future empirical research can exploit large-scale, matched firm-employee data or single-
firm studies with data on wages and bundles of benefits to determine whether changes to one 
form of remuneration are met with changes to others. 
 Second, while a common issue in observational studies of this type, the influence of 
unionization, equity ownership, and CEO background cannot be assessed directly. Though the 
patterns in the data largely support the theoretical claims made herein, there are limits on how 
much information one can infer from these results. Furthermore, though the supplemental 
analyses help address concerns with endogeneity, they cannot completely rule it out. In the 
future, researchers can exploit different methodologies such as interviews, ethnographies, and 
single-firm studies to better elucidate the mechanisms I hypothesized to be driving these results.  
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In a similar vein, there is no way to discern the intent behind ERR increases, and it is 
possible that executives changed the rate for reasons other than to boost earnings. For instance, a 
CEO could be overly optimistic and believe the firm can outperform historical market returns. 
Unless these other rationales for increasing the ERR are correlated with my independent 
variables (e.g., finance CEOs are more optimistic), finding significant results should be more 
difficult. While I cannot claim with complete certainty that some ERR increases were not 
motivated by other factors, the effect of an ERR change on pension expenditures and firm 
earnings is the same irrespective of intent. It also seems reasonable to assume that regardless of 
motive, executives are aware of the impact that ERR changes have on firm earnings.   
CONCLUSION 
One of the primary features of the employment relationship is that it involves the 
exchange of labor in return for various forms of remuneration. Beginning in earnest after World 
War II, firms began rewarding workers with deferred compensation, whereby firms set aside 
funds for the workers’ future with a promise of a lifetime wage in post-retirement for work done 
in the present period. The promises that undergird this relationship have been increasingly 
challenged, as these obligations have proved burdensome to many organizations. As the ability 
of shareholders to influence corporate decision-making increased (Useem, 1993) and the ability 
of employees to do so waned (Western & Rosenfeld, 2011), executives increasingly have found 
ways to deal with those problematic obligations in ways that tend to disadvantage employees.  
In this study, I examined the factors motivating firms to alter the return assumptions of 
their pension plans as a way to boost earnings in the present period and shift worker obligations 
further into the future. By considering how firms react to demands from their employees and 
investors, as well as how a CEO’s background affects employment outcomes, the research 
presented here suggests an important role for organizational theory in linking changes in the 
corporate power structure to practices that directly affect worker and societal welfare. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of ERRs by year 
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Figure 2. Average ERR, 1999 to 2006 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix, 1992-2006 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Expected rate of retrurn (00s) 890.71 82.81 1                     
2 Unionization (%) 0.15 0.30 -0.01 1                   
3 Bank ownershipt-1 (%) 13.64 6.86 0.00 -0.06 1                 
4 Public pension ownershipt-1 (%) 3.15 1.89 0.09 0.00 0.25 1               
5 Company pension ownershipt-1 (%) 0.68 1.14 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.12 1             
6 Insurance co ownershipt-1 (%) 5.14 4.61 0.05 -0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 1           
7 Investment advisor ownershipt-1 (%) 35.84 16.19 -0.05 -0.06 0.12 0.18 0.04 0.12 1         
8 CEO Finance 0.30 0.46 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 1       
9 Total assetst-1 (log) 8.47 1.54 -0.01 -0.11 0.25 0.05 0.10 0.07 -0.03 0.24 1     
10 Revenue growth (%) 0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.00 1   
11 Return on equityt-1 (%) 11.78 31.62 0.00 -0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 1 
12 Debt-to-assets ratiot-1 (%) 22.76 15.63 0.06 0.12 -0.18 -0.09 -0.05 -0.05 0.06 -0.07 -0.16 -0.01 -0.08 
13 DB assets (log) 19.55 1.83 0.11 0.03 0.26 0.08 0.06 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.59 -0.08 0.03 
14 Funding status (%) 104.90 30.59 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.21 0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.01 
15 Shareholder rights 14.04 2.63 -0.05 0.02 -0.14 -0.15 -0.05 0.01 -0.15 -0.03 0.08 0.01 0.00 
16 CEO tenure 5.29 6.38 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.03 0.01 
17 CEO pay from options (%) 28.13 25.05 0.14 -0.03 0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.03 
18 Industry Mergerst-1 6.13 7.60 0.00 -0.03 0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.10 0.29 0.03 0.04 
19 Missed earnings 0.44 0.50 0.01 0.01 -0.10 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.14 -0.06 
20 Avoid missed earnings 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 
21 Industry average ERRt-1 (%) 8.97 0.43 0.34 0.05 -0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 -0.11 -0.03 -0.19 -0.07 -0.01 
                              
Variables 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21       
12 Debt-to-assets ratiot-1 (%) 1                         
13 DB assets (log) -0.06 1                       
14 Funding status (%) -0.09 0.13 1                     
15 Shareholder rights 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 1                   
16 CEO tenure -0.01 -0.10 0.03 0.05 1                 
17 CEO pay from options (%) -0.09 0.08 0.00 -0.05 -0.08 1               
18 Industry Mergerst-1 -0.06 0.20 0.09 -0.01 -0.02 0.14 1             
19 Missed earnings 0.13 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.02 1           
20 Avoid missed earnings 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.15 1         
21 Industry average ERRt-1 (%) 0.06 -0.06 0.27 -0.03 0.03 0.18 -0.03 0.06 0.02 1       
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Table 2. Fixed-effects regression on ERRs on pension assets, 1992-2006 
Variables M1 M2 M3 
Unionization (%) -24.182**   
  
-24.123** 
(8.192) (9.254) 
Bank ownershipt-1 (%) 
0.319+   0.472* 
(0.163)   (0.185) 
Public pension ownershipt-1 (%) 
1.741***   0.936* 
(0.489)   (0.470) 
Company pension ownershipt-1 (%) 
-1.632*   -1.179 
(0.780)   (0.835) 
Insurance co ownershipt-1 (%) 
-0.145   0.166 
(0.249)   (0.286) 
Investment advisor ownershipt-1 (%) 
0.145+   0.099 
(0.078)   (0.095) 
CEO Finance 4.121+   5.442* 
(2.307)   (2.535) 
Total assetst-1 (log) 
 3.362 3.495 
  (2.287) (2.319) 
Revenue growth (%)   -15.928 -23.383 
  (30.873) (30.898) 
Return on equityt-1 (%) 
  -0.048+ -0.048+ 
  (0.025) (0.025) 
Debt-to-assets ratiot-1 (%) 
  0.031 0.040 
  (0.095) (0.095) 
DB assets (log)   -1.083 -1.191 
  (1.531) (1.533) 
Funding status (%)   0.074+ 0.066 
  (0.043) (0.043) 
Shareholder rights   -4.364*** -3.992*** 
  (0.793) (0.804) 
CEO tenure   0.443** 0.448** 
  (0.159) (0.159) 
CEO pay from options (%)   0.016 0.014 
  (0.037) (0.037) 
Industry mergerst-1 
  0.118 0.093 
  (0.142) (0.143) 
Missed earnings   1.960 2.032 
  (1.654) (1.657) 
Avoid missed earnings   23.045*** 23.096*** 
  (3.796) (3.793) 
Industry average ERRt-1 (%) 
  11.495*** 10.970*** 
  (3.231) (3.234) 
Constant 915.984*** 983.859*** 975.188*** 
(2.602) (12.062) (12.326) 
Observations 6,803 5,619 5,610 
Firms 708 658 658 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.31 0.33 0.36 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. Tests are two-tailed             
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 3. Error correction regression model on ERRs on pension assets, 1993-2006 
  M4 
Variables Coefficient St Error 
Unionization (%) -20.358*** (1.954) 
∆ Unionization (%) -33.909*** (8.985) 
Bank ownership (%)  0.695*** (0.102) 
∆ Bank ownership (%) 0.775*** (0.163) 
Public pension ownership (%) 0.489*** (0.367) 
∆ Public pension ownership (%) 1.749*** (0.526) 
Company pension ownership (%) -2.639*** (0.483) 
∆ Company pension ownership (%) -2.432*** (0.473) 
CEO Finance 3.608*** (1.353) 
∆ CEO Finance 19.606*** (2.782) 
Constant 997.012*** (33.784) 
Observations 5,772   
Adjusted R-squared 0.770   
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. Tests are two-tailed 
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses    
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Table 4. Two-stage least squares regression on ERRs on pension assets, 1992-2006 
Variables M5 M6 M7 
Unionization (%) -13.199 -1.960 -51.925** 
(13.596) (17.597) (19.347) 
  First stage 
Analystst-1 0.106*** 0.025*** 0.013** 
  (0.169) (0.005) (0.004) 
Bank ownershipt-1 (%) 6.565*     (2.773)     
Public pension ownershipt-1 (%) 
  27.649*   
  (12.513)   
Company pension ownershipt-1 (%) 
    21.127 
    (25.246) 
CEO Finance 3.465 2.477 15.208* 
(3.142) (3.784) (6.073) 
Total assetst-1 (log) 
-0.748 -6.397 -4.677 
(3.227) (5.090) (5.224) 
Revenue growth (%) -11.141 -53.465 -22.564 
(38.445) (38.371) (40.054) 
Return on equityt-1 (%) 
-0.049+ -0.000 -0.084* 
(0.028) (0.040) (0.037) 
Debt-to-assets ratiot-1 (%) 
0.225 -0.089 -0.129 
(0.146) (0.131) (0.160) 
DB assets (log) -4.293* 0.070 -1.950 
(2.173) (2.248) (2.089) 
Funding status (%) 0.049 0.046 0.113 
(0.067) (0.076) (0.092) 
Shareholder rights -2.996* -1.560 -3.256* 
(1.313) (1.759) (1.417) 
CEO tenure 0.234 0.198 0.131 
(0.194) (0.220) (0.274) 
CEO pay from options (%) -0.003 0.034 -0.012 
(0.046) (0.049) (0.053) 
Industry Mergerst-1 
0.007 -0.111 -0.593 
(0.149) (0.191) (0.481) 
Missed earnings 0.211 0.373 1.053 
(2.079) (2.301) (2.317) 
Avoid missed earnings 24.770*** 25.245*** 19.481*** 
(4.457) (4.715) (4.636) 
Industry average ERRt-1 (%) 
10.436* 10.289* 12.254* 
(4.453) (4.633) (5.284) 
Observations 5,554 5,550 5,550 
Firms 628 628 628 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. Tests are two-tailed  
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 5. Triple-difference regression on ERRs on pension assets, 1992-2006 
Variables M8 M9 M10 M11 M12 
Post-SEC Warning -85.696*** -86.493*** -87.915*** -95.551*** -89.565*** (6.295) (6.717) (6.710) (6.719) (6.817) 
High ERR -22.349+ -20.777 -21.516 -23.843+ -18.617 (13.116) (13.175) (13.205) (13.116) (13.319) 
High ERR x Post-SEC warning -20.891*** -20.898*** -26.727*** -18.597*** -26.027*** (3.446) (4.153) (4.245) (4.200) (4.243) 
Unionization (%)   -25.176** -26.426** -18.562* -25.743**   (9.219) (9.243) (9.251) (9.231) 
Bank ownershipt-1 (%)   1.156*** 0.423* 0.375* 0.405*   (0.235) (0.185) (0.183) (0.184) 
Bank ownership x High ERR   -1.446**       
  (0.439)       
Bank ownership x Post-SEC warning   -1.584***       
  (0.350)       
Bank ownership x High ERR x Post-SEC warning   1.017+       
  (0.555)       
Public pension ownershipt-1 (%) 
  1.179* 1.324+ 1.152* 1.032+ 
  (0.577) (0.676) (0.575) (0.577) 
Public pension ownership x High ERR     -0.942     
    (1.230)     
Public pension ownership x Post-SEC warning     -2.741     
    (2.115)     
Public pension ownership x High ERR x Post-
SEC warning 
    9.558*     
    (3.839)     
Company pension ownershipt-1 (%) 
  -1.253 -1.298 0.042 -1.267 
  (0.829) (0.832) (0.939) (0.831) 
Company pension ownership x High ERR       0.259   
      (2.173)   
Company pension ownership x Post-SEC warning       -15.708***   
      (2.454)   
Company pension ownership x High ERR x Post-
SEC warning 
      4.942   
      (5.388)   
CEO Finance   4.991* 5.154* 4.622+ 5.001 
  (2.513) (2.521) (2.511) (3.278) 
CEO Finance x High ERR         -4.593 
        (6.224) 
CEO Finance x Post-SEC warning         -1.221 
        (4.338) 
CEO Finance x High ERR x Post-SEC warning         16.852* 
        (7.756) 
Constant 987.642*** 976.545*** 979.852*** 978.847*** 978.905*** 
(12.384) (12.626) (12.640) (12.588) (12.675) 
Observations 5,606 5,597 5,597 5,597 5,597 
Firms 658 658 658 658 658 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.357 0.365 0.362 0.367 0.362 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. Tests are two-tailed 
Standard errors in parentheses      
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